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Key Points 
Given that the UK is one of the largest economies in the Europe Union – with per capita 
income above the EU average and therefore a net contributor – there have been concerns that 
the country’s decision to leave the EU could strongly impact the EU budget. On closer 
scrutiny, however, we find that the impact will be rather small due to the effects of the UK 
rebate and to the potential contribution the UK would be obliged to make as a condition to 
obtain access to the internal market. If the UK remains outside the internal market, tariff 
revenues would make up a considerable share of the ‘net loss’. On balance, the financial 
savings for the UK would be negligible and the impact on member states would be 
manageable. Also the impact on the classification of regions in EU Cohesion Policy is 
projected to be minimal and the European Fund for Strategic Investments is not affected by 
changes in membership. 
Policy Recommendations 
If or when the UK government triggers Art. 50, it should consider the option of remaining 
until the end of the current Multiannual Financial Framework and simply stepping out from 
the next programming period. This would prevent a policy vacuum on regional 
development and facilitate trade and internal market negotiations.  
Despite the manageable impact of Brexit on the EU budget, this is no time for complacency. 
The budget is exposed to considerable risks from further external shocks and the flexibility 
instruments have reached their limits. Brexit should be seen as an opportunity to 
fundamentally rethink the way in which the budget is designed and negotiated.  
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t is undeniable that the rhetoric surrounding the EU budget has played a relevant role in 
the Brexit debate. Leave campaigners portrayed the UK net contribution to the EU as a 
burden and a constraint on national sovereignty. They exclusively focused on direct 
savings, resorted to incorrect figures, and ignored potential negative impacts of abandoning 
the EU on regional development,1 innovation2 and farm income.3 In a number of cases, the 
importance of the UK as “major” net contributor was expressed,4 giving the impression that 
the exit of the UK from the EU would cause considerable damage to the EU budget. Closer 
scrutiny, however, does not lead to such a conclusion. 
Before turning our attention to these issues, it is worth mentioning the irony that the first 
post-EU referendum revision of EU budget allocations favours the UK. Exactly one week 
after the Brexit vote, the European Commission’s technical adjustment for the 2017 
budgetary allocations translated into an increase of EU funds for the UK.5 The adjustment of 
the financial envelope for the UK under the cohesion policy, due to a relative worsening of 
its GNI, is not substantial,6 but the UK – after Greece, Italy and Spain – benefits the most 
among the member states from the revision. What matters, however, is the expected change 
to the EU budget in the medium to long term and how negotiations concerning the 
multiannual financial framework (MFF) will be affected.  
 
What changes for the EU budget? 
To explain the impact of Brexit in a simplified manner, we look at the 2014 budget.7 If the UK 
had to pay its contribution to the EU in full, i.e. approximately €20 billion, the net 
contribution – and thus the budgetary shortage after Brexit – would amount to over €13.1 
billion. This actually equals close to 10% of the EU budget and it would be a rather difficult 
loss for the member states to absorb. Thanks to Mrs Thatcher, however, and the rebate deal8 
she negotiated in 1984, the UK contribution – and therefore the loss for the EU budget – is 
much less. It amounts to about €14 billion (including traditional own resources and customs 
duties), and the net thus is only €7 billion. The complete British exit for the 2014 budget 
would have reduced internal EU budget expenditures (UK receipts) by €7 billion: nearly €4 
billion for agriculture, €1.7 billion for regional policy, €1 billion for competitiveness funding 
(including €750 million for Horizon 2020) and a few bits and pieces in other policies (see 
Table 1).  
 
                                                     
1 See Bachtler & Begg (2016), Bachtler & Mendez (2016) and Springford et al. (2016).  
2 Hook & Szomszor (2016). 
3 See Van Berkum et al. (2016).  
4 See Irwin (2015). 
5 See European Commission (2016).  
6 According to European Commission (2016), the original EU budget allocated to the UK for the period 
2017-20 was €5,488.2 million, and it increased by €50 million to €5,538.2 million, in 2011 prices.  
7 We refer to actual own resources and operating budgetary budget for the year 2014 and not to the 
latest data available, i.e. 2015, as the latter are influenced by an increase in GNI and an appreciation of 
the British Pound, which makes 2015 unrepresentative of the average UK contribution to the EU. In 
2016 and subsequent years, such levels are unlikely to be reached as the UK own resources will be 
affected by the current depreciation of the British Pound and by the UK rebate which will be 
compensating for the relatively high 2015 contributions.   
8 For more information about the impact of the rebate deal on EU Own Resources, see Núñez Ferrer et 
al. (2016).  
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Table 1. UK payments, based on the 2014 budget 
 Expenditures (€ million) 
CAP 3.952 
Regional Policy 1.723 
Competitiveness Funds 
of which Horizon2020 
1.023 
748 
Other 
of which Security & Citizenship 
286 
137 
TOTAL EU Expenditure in the UK 6.985 
 Receipts (€ million) 
Traditional Own Resources & Customs 2.731 
VAT-based Contribution 2.933 
GNI-based Contribution 14.525 
UK Rebate -6.066 
Adjustment Justice and Home Affairs -50 
TOTAL UK Contribution to the EU 14.072 
NET LOSS for the EU Budget 7.087 
Source: Based on European Commission data. 
Without taking into account the traditional own resources of the EU, the UK’s net 
contribution, according to the operating budgetary balances used by the European 
Commission, was only €4.9 billion, representing 0.23% of GNI. If all expenditure is included, 
such as external action, which is not included in net balance calculations, this reaches 0.3% of 
GNI, or €6 billion. The overall savings for the UK is thus 0.35% of its GNI, assuming that the 
UK retains the same customs tariff income. 
If, for the sake of simplicity, we simply take the UK out of the picture and imagine that the 
shortfall is redistributed amongst the – remaining – member states (see Table 2, Scenario A). 
Under the assumption that the EU decides not to reduce external action expenditure, the 
“rebates on the UK rebate” enjoyed by Germany, the Netherlands, Austria and Sweden 
would also disappear.  
The biggest impact would be on Germany with an increase in contributions of €2.56 billion 
(9% increase), followed by France with €1.47 billion (7% increase). Most countries would 
have seen their contributions increase for the 2014 budget, with some notable exceptions. 
There are in fact (relatively small) savings for Greece, Bulgaria, Latvia, and interestingly also 
for the Netherlands. Such impact is the result of the combined effect caused by i) the change 
in the weight of the different sources (UK VAT and customs contributions impact) and ii) the 
redistribution caused by the  removal of the rebate and associated rebates.  
Ultimately, the impact on the EU budget may be less sizable, as the UK will have to 
negotiate, in the framework of its future relationship with the EU, some contribution to the 
EU budget and access to the single market. The UK may want to contribute to some selected 
EU policies, such as Horizon 2020 for instance, for which the UK is de facto a leading net 
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beneficiary. To model this, in a second scenario, we imagine the UK receiving a similar status 
as Norway does in the EEA, at least for what pertains to its contribution to the EU (Scenario 
B). If the UK were to contribute to the EU a share of its GDP similar to that of Norway, its 
contribution would amount to €3.5 billion. The contributions of Norway to EU operations are 
part of the ‘other income’ in the EU budget, and thus it is reasonable for the EU to reduce the 
contributions of the remaining 27 member states proportionally to take this participation into 
account.  
Table 2. Simulation changes in gross contributions, using 2014 budget  
 Scenario A 
UK contributions set to zero 
Scenario B 
UK as EEA member 
 € million % change € million % change 
BE  +191.9 +4.98 +72.0 +1.93 
BG  - 4.9 -1.24 -17.1 -4.43 
CZ  +74.6 +5.39 +31.6 +2.36 
DK  +265.4 +10.71 +186.5 +7.77 
DE  +2562.0 +9.03 +1676.4 +6.10 
EE  +5.6 +3.05 -0.1 -0.03 
IE  +104.4 +6.83 +56.8 +3.84 
EL  -59.4 -3.36 -112.6 -6.57 
ES  +141.2 +1.39 -172.3 -1.76 
FR  +1477.2 +7.02 +827.9 +4.06 
HR  +22.7 +5.53 +10.2 +2.57 
IT  +791.9 +5.22 +311.1 +2.12 
CY  +17.9 +11.13 +13.0 +8.32 
LV  -13.5 -5.83 -20.6 -9.20 
LT  +12.2 +3.67 +1.7 +0.53 
LU  +51.1 +18.05 +42.3 +15.43 
HU  +63.9 +6.70 +33.9 +3.67 
MT  +8.2 +11.14 +6.0 +8.32 
NL  -71.7 -1.13 -269.0 -4.39 
AT  +493.0 +15.48 +395.0 +12.80 
PL  +207.3 +5.55 +89.3 +2.47 
PT  +26.2 +1.58 -24.8 -1.54 
RO  +24.3 +1.77 -19.3 -1.45 
SI  +30.6 +8.57 +19.7 +5.69 
SK  +57.2 +8.38 +35.2 +5.32 
FI  +187.0 +9.52 +126.2 +6.63 
SE  +421.3 +9.91 +288.7 +0.07 
Source: Own calculations based on European Commission data. 
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Such a hypothesis, in a more realistic vein, entails a loss for the EU budget of approximately 
€3.4 billion (for the 2014 budget case), and halves the financial benefit for the UK of leaving 
the EU, an amount that is easily won or lost in a €2 trillion economy by small changes in any 
government revenue parameter. The result is a rather low impact for member states, and for 
some member states (BG, EE, EL, ES, LV, NL, PT, RO), the overall impact is actually a 
reduction in gross contributions. 
During the present MMF, the impact of the UK exit will also be reduced by the fact that 
commitments that have been taken during the membership of the UK will still need to be 
financed by the UK contribution. This means that some payments will possibly continue 
until final closure of programmes and decommitments in 2023. Overall, the impact of the 
UK’s exit will be manageable.  
Two additional elements point in the direction of a “no-catastrophe” verdict for the EU 
budget in the aftermath of Brexit. First, a preliminary analysis carried out by the Conference 
of Peripheral Maritime Regions of Europe (CPMR) highlights that there won’t be substantial 
changes to the geography of convergence regions with the UK out of the picture. Changes 
would affect marginally only France, Italy, Spain and Bulgaria.9 Secondly, assuming the 
European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) is extended, given its market-based design, 
it is not likely to be affected by changes in membership. However, the UK can be negatively 
affected, even though EFSI regulations allows for projects in non-EU countries.  
The UK’s access to EFSI financing will be constrained by the requirement that another 
member state must be involved, de facto making any use of EFSI only possible for cross-
border investments.10 Thus, the impact of Brexit on the UK’s use of EU financial instruments 
and EFSI may affect it, as the country is one of the main beneficiaries. 
Ironically, in case the UK were to leave the single market and tariffs were to be imposed on 
exported products to the EU in line with WTO rules, the tariff revenues going to the EU 
budget could be potentially important. The value of goods exported to the EU in 2015 
hovered around £220 billion, a value at the present exchange rate of €255 billion. Assuming 
that UK exports to the EU do not fall, just a 2% average tariff would bring as much as €4.6 
billion in revenues for the EU budget, after collection fees of the member states (20%). That 
would make up a considerable share of the ‘net loss’. This results in a situation in which the 
impact on the revenue side remains rather similar whether or not the UK participates in the 
single market; what changes is the way in which the UK contributes to the EU budget: from 
government transfers to tariffs on exports. To some extent this reveals the irony of the net 
balance disputes, which are based on public transfers and ignore the wider aspects of the EU 
and the single market. British exporters lose from the costs of tariffs, and importers lose from 
UK tariffs. Costs tend to affect demand, and thus the financial losses from tariff barriers can 
easily exceed any ‘net contribution loss’ by a multiple. 
 
 
                                                     
9 Three regions in France, plus Umbria and Sardinia in Italy would pass from Transition to More 
Developed Region status. Alicante's region and one region in Bulgaria would pass from Low 
Developed Region (LDR) to Transition. Interestingly, that would be the first Bulgarian region getting 
out of LDR status. 
10 See Art. 8 of EFSI Regulations. Projects can involve Enlargement, EU Neighbourhood, EEA, EFTA 
and OCTs (overseas countries and territories).  
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What changes to expect in the MFF negotiations?  
Since the negotiations over the UK’s exit from the EU will last at least two years, and given 
that the UK government does not seem inclined to trigger Art. 50 with any urgency, 
membership and participation to the budget may well be binding till 2019. With the MFF 
ending in 2020, it would seem relatively logical for the UK to seek to avoid exit negotiations 
to the current MFF and simply step out from the next programming period. Thus, the UK 
could be free from the obligation to contribute to the EU budget as of January 2021,11 thereby 
avoiding the need to rush into a cumbersome set-up of domestic regional development 
grants securing the sustainability of EU-funded projects12 and preventing a policy vacuum 
(Bachtler & Mendez, 2016). The rather complex array of negotiations that the UK would face, 
covering access to the internal market for goods, services and capital and trade deals with 
third countries, may also serve as a compelling reason to avoid difficult negotiations to exit 
the current programming period.  
However, rationality does not seem to have played an important role in the politics of Brexit 
and there might be a demand for a prompt end to UK contributions to the EU. The 
negotiations might be negatively affected by yearly budget disputes. The likelihood of an 
accumulation of the ‘RAL’13 may lead to additional budgetary requirements. Other 
difficulties may also create budgetary demands, which would affect the negotiations and put 
the UK negotiators into a confrontational mode for domestic political reasons. This could 
lead to less than constructive negotiations.   
But this is hardly the time for complacency 
Despite the manageable impact of Brexit, the EU should not sit on a false sense of security, 
ignoring the level of risks facing the EU budget and the impact of further mismanagement of 
possible crisis developments: enduring migration problems, climatic disasters, new financial 
crisis, etc. The financial, economic, debt and migration crises have already stretched the EU 
budget close to its limit and practically exhausted the existing ‘flexibility’ instruments. There 
is little doubt that the entire architecture of the EU budget is in need of deep revision.  
Enderlein (2016) stresses that Brexit offers an opportunity to substantially revise EU budget 
arrangements, including modification of the 7-year framework, development of true own 
resources and a clearer and more efficient division of powers between the European 
Commission and the member states. The mid-term review of the MMF expected by the end 
of 2016 is not likely to bring substantial changes to either account for Brexit or longer-term 
budgetary revisions. However, the review could propose a methodology to reassess the role 
of the EU budget in collaboration with the member states, potentially also bringing in 
participation by national parliaments. These proposals are also reflected in the independent 
report (Núñez Ferrer et al., 2016) to the High Level Group on Own Resources, chaired by 
                                                     
11 As mentioned earlier, bills for EU-funded projects in the framework of the programming period 
2014-20 can become due for payment up until 2023.   
12 Following Bachtler & Begg (2016), the EU can hardly agree on a setting where the UK stops 
payments to the EU budget and still receives funding for EU-backed projects. If the UK wants to end 
its EU budget contributions, any EU-funded project in Great Britain would either stop being 
sponsored or must be funded wholly by the UK Government. 
13 French acronym for “reste à liquider”, it identifies outstanding commitments to the EU budget. 
Already in normal circumstances, the multiannual structure of the EU budget programming entails a 
rising profile of payments towards the end of the MFF; in addition, the economic and public debt 
crisis at the beginning of the financial framework caused a postponement of several payments, 
resulting in a particularly low level of payments during the first half of the programming period.  
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Mario Monti, which proposes a reform process based on milestones, e.g. reaching a certain 
reform in the expenditures before triggering a new resource. A different process of iterative 
negotiations and a process of reforms and adaptation could be envisaged, rather than 
adopting a single, big overarching proposal by the European Commission. The world has 
changed, and so too have the ways of working and communicating; it is time to 
fundamentally rethink the way the budget is designed and negotiated. 
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